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Off-Label Drug Risks:
Toward a New FDA Regulatory Approach
George Horvath*
INTRODUCTION

Well over a million people in the United States are injured or killed by
prescription drugs each year.' The challenge for regulators is to ensure that
drugs are safe and effective 2 while limiting the adverse effects of regulation
on innovation and timely access to new products.3 In the United States the
primary regulator of drug safety is the federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).4 Before a manufacturer can market a prescription drug it must obtain
FDA approval through either the New Drug Application (NDA) process (for
"new" or brand drugs) or the Abbreviated NDA (ANDA) process (for generic
drugs). 5 These processes provide the FDA with a wealth of information about
drug safety and effectiveness. 6
The primary way through which the FDA communicates this information
about drug risk and effectiveness to prescribers is through the drug label,
which the Agency describes as a "compilation of information based on a
thorough analysis of the new drug application.",7 The information presented
George Horvath is a Post-Doctoral Fellow and Lecturer at Berkeley Law.
1 See Justin M. Mann, FDA Adverse Event Reporting System: Recruiting Doctors to Make

Surveillance a Little Less Passive, 70 FOOD & DRuGL. J. 371, 381 (2015) (citing 2013 data
that 1.1 million voluntary reports of injuries and death were submitted to the FDA's Adverse
Event Reporting System [FAERS]).
2 See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 2, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (1906) (repealed)
(prohibiting sale of "misbranded or adulterated or poisonous or deleterious... drugs [and]
medicines"); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040, 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.) (prohibiting interstate
movement of misbranded and adulterated drugs and devices); Keefauver-Harris
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 780 (1962) ("An act to
protect the public health."); id. (adding effectiveness as criterion for new drug approval).
3 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355
(j)(2018), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (creating streamlined Abbreviated New
Drug Approval pathway for generic drugs); see also Food & Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (establishing the
least burdensome principle for ensuring medical device effectiveness and substantial
equivalence); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016)
(strengthening and extending application of least burdensome principle).
4 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of GovernmentRegulation of Medical Products,
82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1764 (1996) (describing FDA's role as overseeing a system of
comprehensive drug licensure).
5 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b), U) (2018) (establishing the new drug application process for new
drugs in subsection (b) and the abbreviated new drug application for the bioequivalent,
generic, version of a previously approved drug in subsection U)).
6Id.

7 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and

Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3968 (Jan. 24, 2006) (citing the FDA's preamble in
its 2000 proposed rules amending the 1979 physician labeling regulations); See 21 C.F.R. §
1.3(a), (b) (2019) ("Labeling" is a broader category of materials than "label." The FDA
defines the latter as "any display of written, printed, or graphic matter on the immediate
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in a label "must be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience," 8 and must be limited to the indications for which the drug has
been approved. 9 Information about non-approved (off-label) uses generally
may not be included on a drug label.'0
Off-label drug use is a necessary and proper part of medical practice."
Overall, an estimated twenty-one to fifty percent of all prescriptions are for
off-label indications. 2 In some patient groups, this number may exceed
eighty percent. 3 Many of these uses have become the standard of care.14 On
the other hand, many off-label uses-up to seventy-nine percent by some
estimates-are not supported by strong clinical evidence.' 5 As a result,
physicians write millions of prescriptions each year 16for drugs that may be
ineffective and risky for the conditions being treated.
This Article seeks to accomplish two goals. One goal is to provide a
framework for a new approach to reducing the risks associated with off-label
drug use. Traditionally, the FDA has attempted to address the risks of offlabel drug use by regulating manufacturers' off-label promotion, 17 but these
attempts have at best yielded only limited success."' Manufacturers continue
to promote their drugs for off-label indications and physicians continue to
prescribe drugs for off-label indications, even in the absence of supporting
evidence. 19 In this Article, I propose a new way the FDA can address
container of any article." Labeling "includes all written, printed, or graphic matter
accompanying an article at any time while such article is in interstate commerce or held for
sale after shipment or delivery in interstate commerce.").
8 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(3) (2019).

9 See 21 C.F.R. §201.57(c)(2) (2019) (discussing that the label must state that the drug is

indicated for use in connection with specific diseases or conditions).
10See infra Part II (describing FDA's regulation of off-label promotion).
" See Christian Tomaszewski, Off-Label: Just W/hat the Doctor Ordered,2 J. MED.
TOXICOLOGY 87, 87 (2006) (citing the holding from Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff'sLegal Comm.

- "The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the 'off-label usage of medical devices is an
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate ....
').
12 Aaron

S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion:Balancing PublicHealth
Goals and CommercialSpeech, 37 Am.J. L. &MED. 225, 234 (2011).
13 See generally,Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U.
CHI. L. REv. 124, 125 (2017) ("Off-label uses can even constitute the standard of care in
disciplines like oncology, neurology, and psychiatry.").
14See Tomaszewski, supra note 11, at 87 (describing the off-label uses of intravenous
Mucomyst for acetainophen overdose, octreotide for sulfonylurea overdose, and insulin
infusion for verapamil overdose as "doing the right thing").
15Cortez, supra note 13, at 125.
16 See

id. (stating when a physician prescribes off-label, patients can be exposed to
considerable risks).

17See Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceuticals,360 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1557, 1557 (2009) ("The agency has long

maintained the general position that although physicians may freely prescribe drugs for offlabel uses, drug manufacturers may not promote such uses.").
II.
Richardson, Health PolicyBrief Off-Label Drug Promotion,HEALTH AFFS. 1,

18 See infra Part
19 Elizabeth

1-2 (June. 30, 2016).
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physicians' off-label prescribing practices.
The second goal is to help make drug labels more valuable to their
intended audience, the physicians who prescribe drugs. My proposal involves
a modification of drug labels that could succinctly provide physicians with
information about how well supported, or unsupported, their off-label
prescriptions are. The proposal builds upon recent studies by a collaboration
of medical researchers that have identified a simple algorithm that facilitates
the division off-label uses into those which are no more risky than FDAapproved uses from those which carry significantly higher risks.2 °
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines approved and off-label
drug uses. After the thorough premarket evaluation of drug through the NDA
or ANDA process, the risks and benefits of the uses of that drug for approved
indications are very well, albeit imperfectly, characterized. By contrast, the
risks and benefits of the uses of that drug for off-label indications are often
poorly characterized. But this obscures an important distinction: off-label
uses that have strong supporting data are not riskier than on-label uses. By
contrast, off-label uses that lack strong support are significantly riskier.
Part II examines the FDA's traditional approach to addressing the risks of
off-label uses, the regulation of manufacturers' off-label promotion. As this
Part shows, FDA's approach is flawed for several reasons. It may inhibit
valuable information exchanges, has not prevented off-label promotion, and
has been undermined by recent court decisions and legislative actions.2i
Part III ofthis Article provides context for my proposal by reviewing some
of the proposals that other scholars have put forward to address the risks
associated with off-label drug use. Many scholars have focused on shoring
up the FDA's existing ability to police off-label promotion. Others have
proposed ways to expand the FDA's ability to regulate off-label promotion.
This Part highlights a recent, ambitious proposal by Professors Ryan Abbott
and Ian Ayres which suggested ways in which the FDA might influence
physicians' off-label prescribing.
Part IV sets out my proposal. Rather than focusing on manufacturers' offlabel promotion, this proposal focuses on providing information to
pre scribers about the available clinical data concerning the risks and benefits
of off-label uses. Under the proposal, a duty to disclose is imposed on the
drug's manufacturer once off-label prescriptions for a certain condition
account for a certain volume or percentage of a drug's total prescriptions.
The content of this duty is for the manufacturer to disclose to the FDA all
clinical trials, experience, and expert consensus statements that provide
information on the risks and benefits of the drug's off-label use of which the
manufacturer knows or should know. The FDA would evaluate the quality of
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II; see generally Mello et al., supra note 17, at 1558-61 (stating that the
FDA has not prevented off-label promotion in a discussion of both past and present FDA
regulation).
20
21
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the data submitted but would not make a formal risk-benefit determination.
Rather, the Agency would assign a "level of evidence" rating using an
algorithm used by medical researchers. One possible implementation would
yield a simple "Supported by Strong Evidence" or "Not Supported by Strong
Evidence" binary rating, which could be incorporated into the first page of
the FDA-approved drug label.
This proposal attempts to harness physicians' status as learned
intermediaries and their awareness of the threat of liability for negligence or
malpractice. Providing physicians with information, especially information
that an off-label use, no matter how widely accepted, is not supported by
strong evidence should serve at a minimum as a stimulus for prescribers to
evaluate the clinical data. This Part concludes with a preliminary discussion
of some potential difficulties raised by the proposal.
I. OFF-LABEL DRUG USE AND THE INFORMATION DEFICIT PROBLEM
Over the course of the twentieth century, mortality rates in the United
States declined by an astounding fifty percent,2 2 and life expectancy at birth
increased by an equally astounding twenty-nine years. 23 While broad public
health measures such as improved sanitation, reduced smoking rates, and
improved nutrition drove much of this improvement, prescription drugs were
also key contributors.2 4 However, over a million people in the United States
are injured or killed by prescription drugs each year. 25 The challenge from a
regulatory perspective is to ensure that drugs are safe and effective 26 while
limiting the adverse effects that regulation may have on innovation and
27
timely access to new products.

22 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999 874

tbl. 1420, https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec3 1.pdf (last visited October 12,
2019) (reporting a death rate per 1000 per year in 1900 of 17.2 and in 1997 of 8.6).
23 Id. at 874, tbl. 1421.
24 See generally, David R. Francis, Tihy Do Death Rates Decline?, NAT'L BUREAU ECON.
RES., https://www.nber.org/digest/mar02/w8556.html (discussing how the improvement in
mortality rates is attributable to medical products and other changes that took place over the
same period) (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
25

See Marcia Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemptionof State Laws for

ParallelTort Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2015), (citing estimates that over
100,000 people in the United States die from causes related to prescription drugs and
medical devices); Mann, supra note 1, at 381 (citing 2013 data that 1.1 million voluntary
reports of injuries and death were submitted to the FDA's Adverse Event Reporting System
(FAERS)); Thomas J. Moore, et al., SeriousAdverse Drug Events Reported to the Food and
Drug Administration, 1998-2005, 167 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1752, 1754 (2007) (stating that
one-sixth of the FAERS reports were for deaths due to prescription drugs).
26 Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000); § 102, 76 Stat. at 781 (adding effectiveness as criterion for new drug approval).
21 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (creating Abbreviated New Drug Approval pathway for generic drugs); Food
& Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, supra note 3, (establishing the least
burdensome principle for ensuring medical device effectiveness and substantial
equivalence); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (strengthening

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/3

4

Horvath: Off-Label Drug Risks: Toward a New FDA Regulatory Approach
2020

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

The FDA is the primary regulator of drug safety in the United States. 2s As
the "gatekeeper" tasked with approving drugs before they may be marketed
in the United States, the FDA gathers a vast amount of information about
drug safety and effectiveness through the NDA and ANDA processes. 29 The
chief way through which the FDA communicates information about drug risk
and effectiveness to prescribers is through the drug label, which the Agency
describes as the "compilation of information based on a thorough analysis of
the new drug application....".o FDA stated in a 2006 Final Rule that drug
labels are "[t]he centerpiece for risk management of prescription drugs ...
,,31

FDA regulations establish that drug labels "must contain a summary of the
essential scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the
drug." 32 The label "must be informative and accurate and neither promotional
in tone nor false or misleading in any particular., 33 The information provided
in the label "must
be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience. 34 Other information-specifically data from animal studieshas a more restricted role. 35 "Conclusions based on animal data but necessary
for safe and effective use of the drug in humans must be identified as such
36
and included with human data in the appropriate section of the labeling.,
And crucial here, information about non-approved (off-label) uses is
generally forbidden.37
The FDA views drug labels as its principal tool for educating healthcare
professionals about the risks and benefits of approved drugs. 3 s A drug's label
is important to its manufacturer because it determines the bounds of the
manufacturer's promotional efforts. 39 The label is important to lawyers and
courts, who scrutinize the contents of a drug's label to assess whether the
drug was negligently prescribed and whether the manufacturer satisfied its
duty to warn.
So, drug labels are important to everyone. Everyone, that is, except to the
one group toward whom they are actually directed: the healthcare providers
and extending application of least burdensome principle).
28
29

Merrill, supra note 4, at 1764.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018).

30 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and

Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3921, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006).
31 Id.
32

21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(1) (2019).

33Id. § 201.56(a)(2).
34
35

Id.§ 201.56(a)(3).
Id.

36 Id.

37See

infra Part II (discussing FDA's regulation of off-label promotion and drug labels).

See generally FDA CONSUMER HEALTH INFO, A GUIDE TO DRUG SAFETY TERMS AT FDA,
at 2 (Nov. 2012), https://www.fda.gov/media/74382/download. (FDA stating the purpose of
38

prescription drug labeling).
39Mello et al., supra note 17.
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who prescribe drugs. Physicians have a jaundiced view of drug labels that
arises from concerns that the information on drug labels is written from a
marketing perspective, and thus, exaggerate the potential benefits, and also
from a liability avoidance perspective, and thus list even the most remote
possible risks.40 Physicians also worry that the information on drugs labels

may be incomplete .41 Frequently, important information such as potential
adverse effects and limitations on effectiveness for off-label uses are not
contained on the label. 42 As a result, studies have consistently shown that
physicians are unaware of whether the FDA has approved the drugs they
commonly prescribe for the indications they are treating: physicians often are
unaware that they are prescribing drugs off-label.4 3

This Part sets out the relevant issues surrounding the risks of off-label drug
use and the information the FDA provides to physicians through drug labels.
Part I.A examines uses of a drug for which the sponsor has sought and
obtained FDA approval. The uses are associated with relatively small
information deficits (compared to many off-label uses) regarding risk and
effectiveness, although these deficits are still significant. Part I.B then
examines the information deficits associated with off-label drug uses. Often
these uses are supported by little empirical evidence. This has the potential
to expose patients to harm without a reasonable anticipated benefit, but new
findings by medical researchers permits a more granular assessment of the
risk associated with off-label drug use. Thus, the discussion in Part I.B sets
the stage for the remainder of this Article. Part I.C then examines how the
FDA's drug label regime fails to provide relevant information to prescribers.
Before proceeding, I offer one brief note on terminology: The focus of this
Article demands that I distinguish between drug promotion and prescribing.
Thus, when discussing drug sponsor's efforts to convince prescribers to
prescribe their drugs, I use terms including "on-label promotion" and "offlabel promotion." In keeping with the FDA's broad definition of drug
promotion, I include under the term "promotion" activities such as
sponsoring provider educational events and distributing reprints of scientific
40 See Donna T. Chen et al., U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved Indications

and Evidence Base for Commonly PrescribedDrugs: Results of a NationalSurvey, 18

PHARMACOEPLDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY, 1094, 1099 (2009) ("Legal scholars note the
primary purpose of FDA labeling is to guide industry marketing. As a result, many
commentators assert that it is not labeling, but strength of clinical evidence, that physicians
should be aware of and use to guide prescribing.").
41 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Commentary, The Role of Litigation in Defining

Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308, 308 (2007) ("[A] drug's label can vary in its completeness and
balance and may not be updated in a timely way to reflect new data.").
42 See id. (such information is often not presented on the label as "There are often important
gaps in the ascertainment and reporting of adverse effects associated with prescription drugs
...In both the premarketing and post marketing states, lawsuits have helped uncover
important and previously unavailable data about major adverse events.").
43 See, e.g., Donna T. Chen et al., supra note 40, at 1098 (reporting study in which
physicians correctly identified FDA-approved indications for commonly prescribed drugs
just over half the time).
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studies, in addition to traditional sales efforts such as advertising and
detailing. When discussing physician and other providers' prescribing of
drugs, I will use terms including "on-label prescribing" and "off-label
prescribing," and "on-label use" and "off-label use." And when discussing
both off-label prescribing and promotion, I will use the term "off-label
activities."
A. Approved Drug Uses and the Drug Label
The medical products regulatory system utilizes four main sources of
information about drug and device risk: information obtained simply by
characterizing a product as a drug or device, 44 information generated through
the FDA's premarket evaluation processes, 45 information generated through
post-market studies and adverse event reporting, 46 and information generated
or disclosed through discovery and trial in failure-to-warn cases. 47 The
limited understanding of the structure and function of discovered drugs and
of human biochemistry make it nearly impossible to predict the existence of
specific risks and to estimate the magnitude of those risks. 48 Drug risks can
be characterized only after large numbers of humans were exposed to new
drugs.49
Thus, there is a large information deficit regarding the risks posed by all
new drugs at the beginning of their life cycle. The primary means by which
the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs are assured in the United
States is the FDA's premarket evaluation process.50 A manufacturer (or
"sponsor") seeking to market a "new drug"'" must submit an NDA, which
44 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH OFFICE,

FDA REGULATION

OF MEDICAL DEVICES 5

(2016) ("Device classification determines the type of regulatory requirements that a
manufacturer must follow.").
45 See id. at 9 (describing Premarket Approval Process requirement for sufficient scientific
evidence to permit a reasonable assurance of safety).
46 See id. at 30-31 (describing the primary objective of post market surveillance as gathering
data on device failures and the device's impact on the intended population).
47 See generally id. (discussing regulation of Medical Devices including characterizing a
product, the pre-market and post-market process, and warning letters).
48 See Dorothy Davies & Julian Davies, Originsand Evolution ofAntibiotic Resistance, 74
MICROBIOL. MOL. BIOL. REv. 417, 417 (2010) (noting that successful treatments followed
the discovery of antibiotics a half century after the late nineteenth-century discovery of
certain infectious agents).
'9 See The FDA's DrugReview Process:Ensuring DrugsAre Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMNIN. (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-informationconsumers/fdas-drug-review-process-ensuring-dugs-are-safe-and-effective (explaining that
clinical trials for new drugs test approximately 3,000 subjects) [hereinafter FDA's Drug
Review Process]. By contrast, the mid-twentieth century model of medical device
development was one of product design rather than discovery. Because devices are designed,
the site, nature and risks of their actions were viewed as predictable.
50 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2016).
51Id. ("New drugs" are defined as drugs which are "not generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
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imposes the most rigorous information generating and disclosure
requirements to which any FDA-regulated product is subjected.5 2 The
sponsor must identify the specific condition or conditions for which it seeks
FDA approval." 3 The sponsor must generate extensive amounts of new
information about risk and effectiveness by conducting scientific studies,
including at least two well-designed Phase 3 clinical trials.5 4 The Phase 3
clinical trials "are intended to gather the additional information about
effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk
relationship of the drug."55 Phase 3 trials are scientifically rigorous,
employing the randomized assignment of subjects to active treatment and
control arms, double-blinding of subjects and investigators, prespecified

endpoints, and detailed statistical analysis. 5 6 These trials involve several
57
thousand subjects and typically require several years to complete.
Manufacturers must also disclose extensive amounts of information,
including pertinent animal data, known and potential adverse effects of the
drug, clinically significant drug-drug interactions, and epidemiologic data on
related drugs.58 By the time a new drug completes its Phase 3 trials, the
amount of information available to the FDA regarding its risks and
effectiveness is larger than the information available for any other regulated
product.
However, even Phase 3 clinical trials cannot identify all significant new
suggested in the labeling thereof' or which "[have] not, otherwise than in such
investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.").
52 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (1997); 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2002); FDA's Drug Review Process, supra
note 49.
13 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2002).
14 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2002); (Before Phase 3 trials are conducted, a manufacturer must
present preclinical data and conduct Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials. Phase 1 trials involve
twenty to eighty individuals and "are designed to determine the metabolism and
pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing
doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness." Phase 2 trials include up to
several hundred patients with the disease or condition for which the drug is to be marketed,
and aim "to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug ...and to determine the common shortterm side effects and risks associated with the drug."); U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,

Development & Approval Process(Drugs), U. S.FOOD &DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm.
5521 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2002).
56 See Elena Losina et al., OARSI ClinicalTrials Recommendations: Key Analytic
Considerationsin Design, Analysis, and Reporting of Randomized ControlledTrials in
Osteoarthritis,23 OSTEOARTHRITIS & CARTILAGE, 677, 678 (2015) (providing an example of
the clinical trials for osteoarthritis treatment involving randomization, double-blinding and
statistical analysis).
57U.S. Food and Drug Admin., The Drug Development Process,Step 3: Clinical Research,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm.
5' 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008). This includes information generated by the sponsor as well as
information from any other source. Manufacturers must also disclose the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested for the drug's use, the methods used in, and the
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing, and the
manufacturer's proposed labelling. Id.
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drug risks. In fact, it is common for the NDA process not to detect adverse
effects. 59 For example, for the 222 new drugs approved between 2001 and
2010, thirty-two percent had a post-market safety event. 60 The median time
to a safety event was over four years after FDA approval.6'
In contrast to the NDA process for new drugs, the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) established
a relatively quick, low-cost process for generic drugs called the ANDA.62 An
ANDA requires manufacturers to generate very little new information
because generic drugs are copies of NDA-approved new drugs for which
extensive safety and effectiveness information was generated and
disclosed. 63 The only new information required is a small-scale study to
prove "bioequivalence," meaning that the generic drug becomes available at
the site of action at the same rate and to the same extent as that of the brand
drug. 64 No new safety information is required.65 Again, though, adverse
effects arising from generic drug use may only be recognized long after a
generic drug's approval.
Both the NDA and ANDA processes can be seen as mechanisms that force
the production and dissemination of a certain quantum of information about
drug risk and effectiveness. 66 This information-forcing serves at least four
purposes. First, the information permits the relevant regulator, the staff of the
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), to determine
whether the drug meets the substantial evidence standard for approval.67
Second, the information allows patients to decide whether to take the

'9Nicholas S. Downing et al., PostmarketSafety Events Among Novel Therapeutics
Approved by the US Food and DrugAdministration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 J. OF THE
AM. MED. ASS'N. 1854, 1855-56 (2017).
60 Post-market safety events include market withdrawals, additions of FDA-mandated black
box warnings to drug labels and FDA safety communications. Id at 1856.
61 Id. at 1854.
62 See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018)).

See id. (stating that applications are based on already approved drugs).
Jordan Paradise et al., EvaluatingOversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A
Case Study of the FDA and Implicationsfor Nanobiotechnology,37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
598, 601, 622-23 n.28 (2009). The Hatch-Waxman Act imposes on generic drug makers a
"duty of sameness." In addition to bioequivalence, the active ingredient(s) of generic drug
must be the same as those in the brand drug that the generic references and the proposed
labeling must be identical to the label of the reference drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2008).
65 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2008).
66 Other information forcing mechanisms include failure-to-warn claims brought under state
tort and products liability law and the FDA's authority to require post-market reporting and
63

64

clinical trials. Russell G. Thornton, Preemption, Tort Reform, andPharmaceuticalClaims,
PartTwo: Has the Food andDrug Administration Shown It Is Solely Responsible for the
Protection ofPatients? Can It Do So? Will It Do So?, 21 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. 82, 87-

89 (2008).
67 CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

EFFECTIVENESS
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prescribed drug in a simplified form. 68 Third, the information assists payors,
such as Medicare and Medicaid, to decide whether to cover the use of drugs
for various conditions. 69 Fourth, and most relevant here, the information
assists prescribers as they decide whether to prescribe a drug for a specific
patient. 70 The FDA communicates a distilled version of the information it
possesses regarding the effectiveness and risks associated with the use of
drugs for approved indications through drug labels.7 '
Although it is necessary for the FDA to distill the massive amount of
information it possesses about drug safety and effectiveness, the limited
amount of information printed on a drug label, even one running to dozens
of pages, renders labels' utility quite limited to physicians. Physicians have
many other sources of information, including direct access to published
72
studies, expert consensus statements and peer-to-peer communications.
With so much competition, the FDA's drug labels are perceived of by their
target audience-physicians-as offering limited value for FDA-approved
indications. 3
B. Off-Label Uses
A great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on the dangers
associated with off-label uses, 7 4 but off-label prescribing is an important part
of clinical practice. Before engaging with the negative aspects of off-label
prescribing, I will first offer two justifications for it.
The first justification is that off-label use is an essential part of medical
practice. 75 Patients present with problems to be addressed. Physicians have
68 See id. at 20 (outlining that the FDA maintains a "Postmarket Drug Safety Information for

Patients and Providers" communications page and that manufacturers are required to
develop material for distribution to patients upon drug dispensation (citing 21 U. S.C. § 3551(2018)).
Id. at 22.

69
7

at 19.
22.
72 Healthcare Client Services, Most Important Sources ofInformationfor Doctors, KANTAR
MEDIA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.kantarmedia.com/us/thinking-and-resources/blog/mostimportant-sources-of-information-for-doctors.
1Id.

71 Id. at

Jerry Avron & William H. Shrank, EducatingPatientsAbout Their Medications: The
Potentialand Limitations of Written DrugInformation, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 731, 733
73

(2007); FDA Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (C-Span television broadcast Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?40585 1-1/hearing-fdas-fiscal-year-2017-budget&start=2575
(comments of then-FDA Commissioner and physician Robert Califf).
71 See, e.g., Kesselheim, supra note 12, at 226 (providing examples of dangers associated
with off-label use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressants and the antiinflammatory drug Valdecoxib); Joshua M. Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of
Medical Productsin the 21st Century: Off-label Marketing and FirstAmendment Concerns,
314 J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 1795, 1795 (2015); Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and
Extrapolation:Mechanismsfor Regulating Off-Label Use of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE
L.J. 377, 377 (2014); Mello et al., supra note 17, at 1557.

Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (And Their Answers) About OffLabel Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 982, 982-83 (2012). This justification is derived
71

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/3
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certain tools available-therapy, surgery, medications, etc.-that can be used
to address those problems. Providers' conception of the utility of each tool is
formed through the synthesis of multiple streams of information, including
the results of randomized clinical trials, other published studies and reports,
peer-to-peer information exchanges, teachings absorbed during training,
longstanding and widely known patterns of use, personal experience treating
patients, and information communicated in FDA-approved drug labels. 76 In
the exam room or at the bedside, the key question is whether, based on an
evaluation all of the information available at that moment, the balance of the
benefits and the risks of using or refraining from using any given tool is
sufficient. 77 This leads providers to discount the importance of seemingly
static metrics such as whether the FDA has approved a drug for an indication
and to find irrelevant an information source like the FDA-approved drug
label when that label does not contain information about many off-label
78

uses.

Off-label prescribing of FDA-approved drugs is one tool available to
clinicians .79 Data reported in 2003 indicated that, overall, twenty-two percent
of all prescriptions were for off-label indications.8 0 In some patient groups,
this number may exceed seventy percent."' Many of these uses have become
the standard of care. 2 As medicine is practiced today, off-label use of
prescription drugs is both necessary and proper.
The second justification arises from the recognition that off-label
prescribing is important to advance medical knowledge. Sometimes drugs
have beneficial effects on conditions for which they were not originally
approved. Amiodarone, a drug initially approved for the treatment of angina,
was found to be far too toxic to be used for that indication. 3 However, the
drug was found to be remarkably effective at suppressing life-threatening
heart rhythm disorders at lower, and thus, safer doses than were required to
treat angina.8 4 Faced with patients who were at high risk of sudden cardiac
largely from my experiences in my former career as a practicing physician.
76 See Healthcare Client Services, supra note 72 (giving examples of where doctors receive
their information).
77 Theo Raynor, The Benefits ofHedicines Outweigh the Risks of Treatment Says Who?,
PHARM. J. (May 22, 2013), https://www.pharmaceutical-joumal.com/news-and-analysis/thebenefits-of-medicines-outweigh-the-risks-of-treatment-sayswho/l 1 121573.articlefirstPass=false.
78 Wittich et al., supra note 75, at 988-89.
79
Id. at 982.
80 Kesselheim, supra note 12, at 234.
81 Id. at 236.

82 See Tomaszewski, supra note 11, at 887-88 (describing the off-label uses of intravenous

Mucomyst for acetaminophen overdose, octreotide for sulfonylurea overdose and insulin
infusion for verapamil overdose as "doing the right thing").
83 Yoon-Nyun Kim & Hyoung-Seob Park, Adverse Effects of Long-Term Amiodarone
Therapy, 29 KOREAN J. INTERNAL MED. 571, 571 (2014); Lylie A. Siddoway, Amiodarone:
Guidelinesfor Use and Alonitoring, 68 AMER. FAM. PHYSICtAN 2189, 2191-93 (2003).
84 Siddoway, supra note 83, at 2190.
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death from heart rhythm disorders, physicians began to prescribe amiodarone
for these off-label indications."5 Ultimately, this led to amiodarone being
studied and approved for the treatment of certain heart rhythm disorders.8 6
These two justifications are sufficient to reject calls for a general ban on
off-label prescribing. However, off-label uses undoubtedly pose significant
risks. Off-label uses have not been subjected to the information-forcing
mechanisms imposed by the new drug application process. This has two
major consequences. First, the safety and effectiveness of off-label uses have
not been evaluated by the regulator of first resort, the staff of the FDA's
CDER. Second, the safety and effectiveness of some off-label uses cannot be
evaluated by clinicians. Although some off-label uses are well-supported by7
clinical trials, many (up to seventy percent by some estimates) are not.
Quite simply, clinical trial data supporting safety and effectiveness are often
lacking.
Anecdotes of the risks associated with off-label drug use are widely
discussed"" and clinical data demonstrating that off-label use is associated
with increased risk are available for certain uses or populations.8 9 However,
the association of harm with off-label use has only recently been documented
in a broad population sample study published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association.9" Because this study is important to the proposal this
paper puts forth, it is worthwhile to set out in some detail.
A group of researchers at McGill University, Harvard Medical School, and
the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences studied over
46,000 adult patients who were seen at clinics in Quebec. 9' The percentage
of off-label use in this population varied widely, up to 65.6 percent for
anticonvulsant drugs. 92 Adverse events occurred overall at a rate of 13.2 per
every 10,000 person-months. 93 When stratified for approved and off-label94
uses, the risks per 10,000 person-months were 12.5 and 19.7, respectively.
This forty-four percent difference was strongly statistically significant,
which further provides strong support for the concerns that have been raised

85 See id. at 2189 (stating that physicians prescribe amiodarone for heart rhythm disorders).
86

Id.

87 Kesselheim, supra note 12, at 234-3 5.
88 See, e.g., id. at 226 (providing examples of dangers associated with off-label use of

selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressants and the anti-inflammatory drug
valdecoxib).
89 See, e.g., Ji-Hyun Lee et al., Safety andEfficacy of Off-label and UnlicensedMedicines in
Children, 33 J. KOREAN MED. SCi. 1, 1-2 (2018) (presenting evidence that off-label use in
children is associated with increased risk).
90Tewodros Eguale et al., Association of Off-label Drug Use andAdverse Drug Events in an
Adult Population, 176 J.AM MED. ASS'N INTERNAL MED. 55, 55 (2015).
91

9

Id.

2Id. at 58.

93
94

Id.

Id.
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about off-label drug use. 95
The researchers further stratified the off-label uses into those that were
supported by "strong evidence" and those that were not. 9 6 Strong evidence
was determined by using a commercially-available algorithm that
incorporates the efficacy of the use, the strength of recommendations
regarding use, and the strength of evidence (randomized controlled trial
[RCT] with consistent results, RCT with inconsistent results, or no RCT).97
In their study population, the majority of off-label uses were not supported
by strong data: 2.3 percent of all prescriptions were for off-label uses
supported by strong data, while 9.5 percent were for off-label uses
unsupported by strong data. 9s
The association of a lack of strong evidence with the risk of off-label use
is striking. Off-label uses supported by strong evidence were associated with
a risk of serious adverse events of 13.2 per 10,000 person-months, which was
statistically indistinguishable from the risk of adverse events associated with
approved uses. 99 By contrast, off-label uses unsupported by strong evidence
were associated with a risk of serious adverse events of 21.7 per 10,000
person-months. 1° ° The difference was strongly statistically significant, with
off-label uses not supported by strong evidence having a fifty-four percent
higher risk of adverse events. 1° 1
This study, especially if corroborated by other studies, indicates that not
all off-label uses are equivalent. Importantly, a simple metric that assesses
the strength of evidence supporting an off-label use stratifies those uses into
two categories, one whose risk is indistinguishable from approved uses, and
the other with a markedly elevated risk.

C. Off-Label Drug Risk and Effectiveness: FDA Label's Lack of
Information
The FDA last overhauled its regulations governing drug labels in 2 0 0 6 .°2
Despite improvements in the organization, content, and presentation of the
information contained in drug labels as a result of the 2006 Final Rule and
the guidance statements it spawned, drug labels do not contain any
95 Id. The 95 percent confidence intervals were 1.30-1.60. Id.
96 Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient,and Physician CharacteristicsAssociated with Off-

label Prescribingin PrimaryCare, 172
97
Id. at 782.
98 Eguale et al., supra note 90, at 58.
99

ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED.

781, 783 (2012).

Id. at 58, 59.

100

Id. at 59.

101
See id. (reporting multivariate adjusted relative risk).
102See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3921, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (containing the Final Rule
implementing major changes to content and organization of drug labels).
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information about off-label uses of approved drugs.'0 3 Because many
prescriptions are written for off-label indications, for which the FDA does
not evaluate effectiveness and safety, the label often fails to provide any
useful information at all to many prescribers.
One example of this failure is found in the FDA-approved label for the
antiarrhythmic drug Cordarone (generic: amiodarone). The drug was
originally approved in 1985 for the prevention of life-threatening heart
rhythm disorders involving the ventricles. 104 Individuals who develop a
tendency for ventricular tachycardia and ventricular fibrillation can
experience palpitations, dizziness, and abrupt loss of consciousness. 0 5 Most
significantly, these arrhythmias can lead to sudden cardiac death.l°6 Before
implanted defibrillators became feasible for most patients, amiodarone was
considered first-line therapy to reduce the risk of ventricular tachycardia and
fibrillation.' 0 7 Now that defibrillators are widely available and relatively easy
to implant, amiodarone's role in treating ventricular arrhythmias is solely
adjunctive1Os
Over time, amiodarone has become one of the, if not the, most commonly
prescribed drugs used to treat atrial fibrillation, a chaotic disorder of the
upper heart chambers. 10 9 In part, this occurred because evidence emerged
showing that other drugs used to treat atrial fibrillation caused an increased
risk of sudden cardiac death-they promoted fatal heart rhythm
abnormalities, a danger far worse than the abnormality they were prescribed
to treat. 11° Although amiodarone was known to be toxic to the lungs, liver,
thyroid, skin, and other organs, the drug has long been recognized as the most
effective drug to suppress atrial fibrillation."' The leading professional
societies, the American Heart Association, the American College of
Cardiology, and the Heart Rhythm Society, published their most recent joint
guidelines for the management of atrial fibrillation in 2014.112 The societies
10321 C.F.R. §201.57 (2015). In rare instances the FDA may require manufacturers to
include information about an off-label use in a drug label. However, to do so the Agency
must determine that such a use is ineffective under a preponderance of the evidence

standard. Id.

104 FDA, Cordarone Highlights of Prescribing Information 1 (FDA eds., 2018),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/label/2018/018972sO541bl.pdf [hereinafter
FDA Cordarone Higlights].
105MAYO CLINIC, VentricularFibrillation,https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/ventricular-fibrillation/symptoms-causes/syc-20364523 (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
106 Eric Williams & Mohan Viswanathan, Current and EmergingAntiarrhythmic Drug
Therapyfor Ventricular Tachycardia,2 CARDIOLOGY THERAPY 27, 28 (Feb. 20, 2013).
107
Id. at 30.
108
Id. at 29.
109 Norman Wolkove & Marc Baltzan, Amiodarone Pulmonary Toxicity, 16 CAN.
RESPIRATORY J. 43, 43 (Mar. 2009).
110 Williams, supra note 106, at 33.
...
Wolkve & Baltzan, supra note 109, at 47.
112 CRAIG

T.
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considered amiodarone to be a first line therapy for the prevention of atrial
fibrillation." 3
But the drug label for Cordarone, and its generic equivalents, still presents
information solely regarding the drug's use for its FDA-approved
indications,
"[r]ecurrent
ventricular fibrillation
[and r]ecurrent
'
4
hemodynamically unstable ventricular tachycardia." " Consistent with the
prohibition on information about non-approved indications, the label
presents no information regarding the use of amiodarone for the condition
which the drug has come to be used most frequently, atrial fibrillation." 5 The
label does not inform prescribers of the effectiveness of amiodarone for atrial
fibrillation." 6 Nor does the label inform physicians about the risks, which,
because the doses are much lower than for ventricular arrhythmias, are lower
for the treatment of atrial fibrillation." 7 Practicing physicians found it no
surprise when then-FDA Commissioner and physician Robert Califf stated
in a Senate hearing that, "if you talk to doctors, none of them ... read drug

labels.""" In an information-rich environment, prescribers find minimal
value in FDA drug labels.
II. FDA'S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO OFF-LABEL DRUG ACTIVITIES
The regulation of off-label drug activities might be accomplished by many
avenues. State regulatory agencies can, and sometimes do, prohibit
physicians from prescribing drugs for certain indications.' 9 State agencies
likely do not have any barriers to promulgating a blanket ban on off-label
prescribing. 120 Congress could prohibit physicians from prescribing and
pharmacies from dispensing medications, as is currently done with Schedule
I drugs like heroin.12 1 Payors, including Medicare and Medicaid, could refuse
payment for off-label prescriptions. 122 In addition, regulation might be
CARDIOLOGY/AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND

THE HEART RHYTHM SOCIETY 199

(Am. Heart Ass'n et al. eds.,

113Id. at

e233.

114FDA

Cordarone Highlights, supra note 104, at 2.

115

1St ed.

2014).

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id. at4, 5.

118FDA

Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (C-Span television broadcast Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?40585 1-1/hearing-fdas-fiscal-year-2017-budget&start=2575.
119See, e.g., In re Williams, 573 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio 1991) (noting that state medical board
promulgated rle prohibiting prescribing of certain amphetamines for long-term use in
weight loss treatment); see also Patricia Zettler, The IndirectConsequences ofExpanded
Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1053, 1081 (2017) (states have also limited off-label
prescribing of certain drugs through legislation and regulation, consistent with states' longrecognized
authority to regulate medical practice pursuant to their police powers).
120See generally: Commonwealth v.Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 85 (1851) (this would fall under
that states' long-recognized police power to protect the health of its citizens).
121 DrugScheduling, DEA (last accessed Oct. 9, 2019), www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling.
122 CA1t Report: Medicare Coverage For Off-Label Drug Use, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADV.
(Sept. 2010), www.medicareadvocacy.org/cma-report-medicare-coverage-for-off-label-dug-
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accomplished in purely post-hoc fashion through state tort and products
liability law actions.
Instead of relying on these mechanisms, the regulation of off-label drug
activities has largely fallen to the FDA, but the FDA has had a tortured
relationship with off-label drug prescribing and promotion. 123 In general, the
Agency has eschewed attempts at directly prohibiting physicians from
prescribing drugs for off-label indications. 124 The legislative histories of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA) and the Drug Amendments
of 1962 indicate that Congress did not intend to authorize the FDA to regulate
the practice of medicine. 125 Several later amendments to the FDCA, including
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 and the FDA Amendments Act of 2007
included provisions specifically barring constructions of the FDCA which
"limit the practice of medicine."126 In a closely related context, the off-label
use of medical devices, the Supreme Court characterized the FDA's mission
as one of regulating "without directly interfering with the practice of
medicine.' 27 Underlying this division of authority over the healthcare
enterprise into state regulation of the practice of medicine and federal
28
regulation of medical products are longstanding notions of federalism.1
Rather, the FDA has focused on regulating manufacturers' off-label
promotion. 129 The FDA's position has evolved over time, in response to
statutory changes enacted by Congress and to court decisions. 30 The FDCA
does not explicitly bar manufacturers from engaging in off-label
promotion,"s' but it prohibits the "introduction into interstate commerce any
new drug, unless an approval of an NDA or ANDA is effective with respect
to such drug.'32 Promoting a drug for an unapproved use is considered
analogous to introducing the drug into interstate commerce without an NDA
or ANDA for that indication, thus violating § 355(a).' 33 And the FDCA
prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of a drug that is
misbranded. 3 4 A drug is considered misbranded,
[u]nless its labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use; and (2)
use/.
123 Wittich et al., supra note 75, at 982.
124 Id.
125 Wendy Teo, FDA and the Practiceofhxiedicine: Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 305, 307-08 (Sept. 5, 2017).
126 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act Of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 396 (1997);
FDA Amendments Act of 2007, 21 U.S.C. § 1111 (2007).
127 Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
128 Patricia Zettler, Toward CoherentFederalOversight of ledicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
427, 427 (2015).
129 Mello et al., supra note 17, at 1557.
130
Id.at 1558.
131 Id.
132 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2008).
133 Id. § 352.
134
1 d.§ 331.
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such adequate warnings against use in those pathological conditions
or by children where its use may be dangerous to health, or against
unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration or
application, in such manner and form, as are necessary for the
protection of users. 3 5
The FDA considers labeling to include all information "distributed by the
manufacturer for the purpose of explaining the uses of the drug, even if they
are not packaged with the drug.' 1 36 Thus, promoting a drug for unapproved
uses violates the FDCA's misbranding provision.
Under these authorities, the FDA has proscribed manufacturers' off-label
promotional activities for decades, 37 but FDA regulations contain certain
safe harbors. For example, manufacturers may distribute peer-reviewed
article reprints in response to unsolicited questions from physicians regarding
off-label uses and may sponsor unbiased continuing medical education
meetings and courses. 38
The FDA's attempt to minimize the risks associated with off-label drug
prescribing through the policing of off-label promotion is flawed for three
reasons. First, banning or severely restricting off-label promotion may
deprive physicians of valuable sources of information. Drug manufacturers
typically possess the largest amount of information regarding the
effectiveness and risks of the drugs they market. 39 Often the manufacturer
has developed the drug, and thus, has a great deal of information from the
pre-clinical period. After a drug is marketed, health professionals, consumers
and drug representatives report adverse effects to the manufacturer, which in
turn forwards the reports to the FDA. 4 ° Physicians also report information
to manufacturers about adverse effects informally, through interactions with
drug company representatives during "detailing" visits. 14 In turn,
manufacturers may facilitate the exchange of information among physicians
and other healthcare providers, but these exchanges might be chilled by the
threat of prosecution and liability.
Second, the FDA's approach has had only limited success. Manufacturers
continue to promote their drugs for off-label uses. False Claims Act
recoveries by the Department of Justice from manufacturers who engaged in
off-label promotion give some idea of the scope of the ongoing off-label
135 Mello et al., supra note 17, at 1557.
136

Id.at 1558.

137 Michael Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Next Forumfor UnravelingFDA Off-Label

Marketing
Rules: State andFederalLegislatures, 15 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (May 8,2018).
138

Id.

139Kalyani Sonawane et al., SeriousAdverse Drug Events Reported to the FDA: Analysis of
the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System 2006-2014 Database,24 J. MANAGED CARE &
SPECIALTY PHARMACY 682, 686 (July 2018).
140 An analysis of reports of serious adverse drug events to the FDA between 2006 and 2014
showed that 72 percent of reports to the FDA were from manufacturers. See id.
141

Id.
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Bten20 2009 and
n
promotional activities by pharmaceutical companies. 142 Between
143
fraud.
health
to
related
billion
$19
over
recovered
2016, the Department
The bulk of these recoveries came from drug manufacturers who had
promoted their drugs for off-label uses to physicians who then prescribed
those drugs to Medicare and Medicaid patients. 144 These recoveries involved
the off-label promotion of no fewer than twenty-three drugs. 145 As long as
the profits that can be anticipated from off-label promotion exceed the
anticipated losses from government enforcement actions, companies will be
motivated to continue engaging in off-label promotion.
Further, physicians continue to prescribe drugs for off-label uses that are
not supported by strong evidence. As the McGill/Harvard/MCPHS study
discussed in Part I.B demonstrates, the great majority of off-label
prescriptions written by physicians are for indications that lack strong
evidence. 146 To the extent that off-label promotion has driven physicians' offlabel prescribing practices, the FDA's strategy has not succeeded.
Third, the FDA's authority to regulate off-label promotion is rapidly being
eroded. The trend over the past decade has been for courts to invalidate the
FDA's ban on some off-label promotional activities. 147 The FDA and
Department of Justice have strategically refrained from challenging these
rulings, to avoid establishing a nationwide rule. Some states have enacted
laws permitting manufacturers to engage in truthful off-label promotion. 14
Similarly, bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress that would permit
off-label promotion. 149
Thus, the FDA's approach to addressing the risk of off-label drug
prescribing by barring off-label promotion may deprive prescribers of
valuable information, has failed to prevent off-label promotion, and is in
jeopardy of further erosion as courts expand the scope of the commercial
speech doctrine. 0
My purpose here is not to argue that the FDA should abandon its attempts
to regulate drug manufacturers' off-label promotional activities. Regulating
142 U. S. DEPT. JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SIGNIFICANT FALSE CLAIMS ACT SETTLEMENTS &

JUDGMENTS, FISCAL YEARS
143Id.

2009-2016,

HEALTH CARE FRAUD.

144See

id. (including but not limited to recoveries from GlaxoSmithKline ($3 billion), Pfizer
($2.3 billion), Johnson & Johnson ($2.2 billion), Abbott Laboratories ($1.5 billion), Amgen
($762 million), Allergan ($600 million), AstraZeneca ($520 million), and Novartis ($495
million) arising from off-label promotion).
145See id. (listing twenty-three drugs as examples).
146 Eguale et al., supra note 90, at 58.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (truthful off-label
promotion protected commercial speech under CentralHudson test); Amarin Pharma., Inc.
v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 225-226 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (same).
148 See, e.g., H.R. 2382, 2017, 53rd Sess. (Az. 2017) ("Notwithstanding any other law, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer or its representative may engage in truthful promotion of an
off-label use of a drug.").
149Sinha & Kesselheim, supra note 137, at 1.
150 Caronia,703 F.3d at 180.
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off-label promotion is an important tool the FDA possesses, and should
possess, to address the dangers associated with off-label drug use. Rather,
my purpose is to argue that a single-minded focus on off-label promotion is
misguided. I propose that the FDA should focus more on providing
information to prescribers through a modification of physician-oriented drug
labels. Before setting out the details of my proposal in Part IV, Part III
examines a few recent proposals that have been made which address the
dangers associated with off-label drug use.
III. EXISTING PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH OFFLABEL DRUG USE

Scholars writing in medical and legal literatures have decried the risks
associated with off-label drug use. 5 ' Several scholars have formulated
proposals directed at mitigating the information deficits associated
with off15 2
label drug activities and the risks that off-label drug use entail.
Some scholars have focused on maintaining the FDA's current authority
to regulate off-label promotion. Dr. Joshua Sharfstein and Professor R. Alta
Charo recently addressed court decisions that have limited the FDA's ability
to regulate off-label promotion. Responding to the district court decision in
Amarin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug
Administration,'53 which blocked the FDA "from enforcing restrictions on
the marketing and promotion of off-label use of the drug icosapentethyl
(Vascepa)," Sharfstein and Charo warned that limiting FDA's authority to
regulate off-label promotion would bring back "a time of more claims and
less evidence. ''i 54 Further, limiting FDA's authority would result in
"liberalizing off-label marketing [which] may well lead companies to
increasingly forgo key research that truly establishes the safety and efficacy
of their products." '55 Sharfstein and Charo focused on courts' role in limiting
FDA's regulatory authority, urging that courts not use "the First Amendment
to undermine core regulatory functions," which in the prescription drug
context involve serious public health risks. 56
Michael Sinha and Aaron Kesselheim highlighted recent state and federal
legislative activities which "would give wide latitude to manufacturers
engaging in off-label promotion. 'i' 5 7 They cited Arizona's Free Speech in
Medicine Act, which became law in 2017. This Act established that "a
151See id. at 180; see also Sharfstein & Charo, supra note 74, at 1796; see also Abbott &

Ayres, supra note 74; Mello et al., supra note 17, at 1557 (all explaining and highlighting
both general and specific risks of off-label drug use promotion).
152Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 378.
153 Amarin Pharma., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 225-26
(S.D.N.Y.2015).
154Sharfstein

& Charo, supra note 74.
Id. at 1796.
156 Id.
157 Sinha & Kesselheim, supra note 137, at 2.
155
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pharmaceutical manufacturer or its representative may engage in truthful
promotion of an off-label use of a drug."' 58 If the FDA's current regulatory
bar on off-label promotion remained in effect, the act would almost certainly
not survive a preemption analysis. 5 9 Sinha and Kesselheim postulated that
the real purpose of the act was generate just such a challenge, in the hopes of
wiping the FDA's bar off the books. 6 °
Sinha and Kesselheim also discussed bills that had been introduced into
the U.S. Congress, one of which would "create a new safe harbor for
'scientific exchange"' between manufacturers and prescribers, while another
would allow "manufacturers to present information about unapproved uses
to formulary or technology review committees that it 'anticipates could be
sufficient' to support future FDA approval of such unapproved use.' 161 The
authors strongly urge that
legislatures not "unravel current FDA rules relating
' 16 2
to off-label promotion. ,
Aaron Kesselheim and Michelle Mello provided a roadmap for the FDA
to preserve its ability to regulate off-label promotion in a 2014 article 163 in
response to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Caronia.164 In
Caronia,the Second Circuit held that "the FDA's prohibition on promotion
of off-label drug uses was inherently suspect under the Constitution's First
Amendment protection of commercial speech.' 165 The authors suggest that
in the future the FDA should base prosecutions on written (rather than oral)
statements, emphasize that the speech was evidence of the manufacturer's
intent to misbrand the drug, and focus on the falsity of the promotional
statements. 166 Further, the FDA should "make a stronger case that its
'
regulations meet the criteria of the CentralHudson test,"167
which requires
that regulations of commercial speech
be narrowly tailored and advance a
68
substantial government interest.1
Other scholarly works have proposed ways to strengthen the FDA's ability
to regulate off-label promotion. Aaron Kesselheim has proposed a scheme of
"scaled regulation" that imposes varying requirements based on how far an
off-label use deviates from approved uses. 1 69 The proposal by Ryan Abbott
and Ian Ayres discussed below also employs a scaling mechanism based on
158 Arizona H.R. 2382, supra note at 148, at 1.

159 Sinha & Kesselheim, supra note 137.
160 Id.
161 Id.
163

Id.
Id.

164

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).

162

Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Prospectsfor Regulation of Off-label
Promotion in an Era ofExpanding CommercialSpeech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REv. 1539,
165

1541
(2014).
166
Id. at 1540.
16
7 Id. at 1574.
168
1 d. at 1555.
169 Kesselheim, supra note 12, at 255-56.
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how far an off-label use deviates from an approved use, albeit in the service
of regulating off-label prescribing. 170 Kesselheim suggested a three-axis
measure for the degree of deviation, in which the FDA would consider
whether a drug was being used for a different disease, whether it was being
used for an indicated disease but in a different manner, and whether it was
being used at different doses or dosing intervals.' 7'
Kesselheim's proposal reaches quite far, requiring that manufacturers
obtain FDA approval for off-label uses of their drugs. 72 As off-label uses
deviate from approved uses along more axes, the requirements for FDA
approval would be more rigorous. 73 Off-label uses that deviate only on one
axis might be approved through an accelerated pathway. Conversely, more
substantial deviations would require more substantial data for approval. In
essence, Kesselheim's proposal is to require manufacturers to obtain FDA
approval for off-label uses, with the scaled regulation framework serving as
way to limit the regulatory burden this requirement places on manufacturers.
One important limitation on the implementation of a scaled framework is that
the relative importance of Kesselheim's three axes, and possibly other
relevant factors, is currently unknown. Thus, a substantial amount of research
would need to be completed before such a proposal could be implemented.
In 2014, Professors Ryan Abbott and Ian Ayers put forward an ambitious
set of recommendations that focus on off-label prescribing. 7 4 They divided
their recommendations into three general categories, which (1) aimed to
correct some of the information deficits that attend off-label drug use, (2)
leverage the FDA's recently-enhanced authority to require manufacturers to
conduct post-market studies of the risks of off-label uses, and (3) alter
prescribing practices by creating three new boxed warnings that the FDA
175
could require on drug labels.
As the McGill/Harvard/MCPHS study illustrates, data about the
indications for which drugs are prescribed are important, but such data are
largely unavailable in the United States. To mitigate this information deficit,
Abbott and Ayres proposed that drug manufacturers be required to include in
their annual reports to the FDA "a rough breakdown of each approved drug's
annual sales by diagnostic code. ' 'i 76 This, along with a recommendation that
the FDA make a de-identified version of this information publicly available,
could provide the FDA, payors, scholars, and others with a robust set of
information regarding patterns of off-label prescribing.
One potential counterargument is that reporting requirements would
170 Abbott

& Ayres, supra note 74, at 378.
Kesselheim, supra note 12, at 253-54.
17
2 Id. at 254-55.
171

173

Id.

174 Abbott

175

& Ayres, supra note 74, at 378, 409.
Id. at 380-81.

176Id. at

400.
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impose burden in terms of search and reporting costs on manufacturers.
Abbott and Ayres suggested that the FDA could allow manufacturers
"reporting flexibility" to blunt the potential onerousness of this requirement
by imposing a standard that requires manufacturers to report only the

information that they know (or should have known after using "reasonable
diligence"). 7 7 Further, they argued that imposing such a requirement would
not be unduly burdensome because the manufacturers
likely already
178
possessed much of the data that would be required.
Abbott and Ayres also proposed that all prescriptions for which
reimbursement would be sought from any Medicare and Medicaid program
be accompanied by a diagnostic code. 179 Noting that these programs cover
one hundred million people in the United States, the authors view this as
permitting the assembly of a robust database on prescribing patterns.180
Indeed, this proposal would complement the reporting obligation on
manufacturers that their first recommendation would impose."8
Other scholars have raised concerns that such requirements might lead to
fraudulent coding as physicians sought to tailor the diagnostic codes they
submit to the currently-approved indications of a drug. 82 This behavior is
not uncommon, and is motivated by a desire to ensure that patients can afford
to obtain the treatment they need.83 Despite a robust array of statutory
authorities, including the Anti-Kickback Statute184 and the False Claims
Act, 85 and the possibility of steep and highly public financial penalties for
providing false information on a Medicare or Medicaid claim, this type of
fraud remains very common. 186 Abbott and Ayres respond "that the
professionals in these markets are far more likely to comply with providing
diagnostic codes," placing their faith in "the capacity of the
'
Medicare/Medicaid fraud-prevention apparatus. "87
However, it is unclear
how valuable (or feasible) it is to the government to sanction individual
prescribers who provide false diagnostic codes to ensure payment for an
indication for which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
does not reimburse. Most providers are likely low-value targets in terms of
the costs they impose on Medicare and Medicaid. Further, this type of
177 Id. at
178

402.

Id.

179

Id. at 405-06.
180 Id. at 406.
181 Id.
182

Id.

183

Id.

184 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2018).
185 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2009).

186 Jacqueline LaPointe, Over 600 Individuals Chargedin 2018 HealthcareFraud
Takedown, REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (June 28, 2018),

https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/over-600-individuals-charged-in-2018-healthcarefraud-takedown.
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enforcement activity might offend the traditional norms and federalismbased boundaries that afford the states the authority to regulate the practice
of medicine.188
Abbott and Ayres's second maj or category of recommendations sought to
leverage the enhanced authority over post-market testing that the FDA
acquired through the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 (FDAAA). s 9 The FDAAA gave the FDA authority to order
manufacturers to conduct post-market studies "to assess a known serious
risk, to assess signals of a serious risk, or to identify an unexpected serious
nsk."' 90 Abbott and Ayres suggest that the FDA use this authority to force
manufacturers to study the risks of off-label uses.' 9'
To decide when to demand post-market studies of an off-label use, Abbott
and Ayres suggest that regulators formally apply a multi-factor weighing test
similar to Kesselheim's scaled regulation framework.192 A non-exclusive list
of factors for regulators to consider includes how frequently a drug is used
off-label as a percent of all prescriptions, how far the off-label use vanies
from approved uses, how frequently adverse events occur with off-label use,
the risk-benefit trade-offs between non-use and off-label use, and whether a
sufficiently large population of candidates for the off-label use exists.' 93
While these proposed factors appear reasonable, they raise a number of
problems. First, the frequency threshold that Abbott and Ayres appear to have
in mind is large, "perhaps even a majority" of all prescriptions. 1 94 Even a
low-frequency off-label use can result in wide exposure where a drug is very
frequently prescribed. Second, understanding how deviations from approved
uses relates to the risks off-label use will require a great deal of additional
study. 195 Third, the frequency of adverse events and their severity (combining
their third and fourth factors)' 96 misses one key point: these will only trigger
a requirement of post-market study once a risk has been identified. This
problem would likely be mitigated by the passive surveillance mechanismsenhanced reporting, etc.-that constitute the first category of
recommendations that Abbott and Ayres put forward. 197 Lastly, the use of
Timothy S. Jost, Health Care Reform Requires Law Reform, 28 HEALTH AFF.: WEB
(2009) ("[C]onsider[ing] how federal law has limited state healthcare reforms,
how state law impedes federal health reform efforts, and how both constrain innovation in
the private sector.").
189 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 396, 409.
188
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190 Id.at 396.
191 Id.at 409.
19

2Id.at

410-11.

193 Id.

Id. at 410.
195 Sandeep Kumar Gupta & Roopa Prasad Nayak, Off-Label Use ofAedicine: Perspective
194

of Physicians, Patients,PharmaceuticalCompanies andRegulatoryAuthorities, 5 J.
PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACOTHERAPY 88, 88 (2014).
196 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 410-11.
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risk-benefit trade-offs as an a priori means of determining when to require
post-market studies may assume the answer to many of the key questions that
those studies could answer. 9 s
Ultimately, my view of Abbott and Ayres's recommendations in this
category is quite favorable-the FDA should order manufacturers to conduct
post-market studies more often than it currently does. My main criticism is
that the multifactor analysis they posit is not sufficiently data driven and may
lead regulators to require too few post-market studies.
Abbott and Ayres's final category of recommendations involves the
creation of three new boxed warnings that the FDA could require for offlabel uses.' 99 These warning categories, color-coded red, black, and gray, are
portrayed as involving scaled levels of enforcement stringency.200 For all of
these categories, off-label promotion would be prohibited. 20 ' Further, all
prescriptions for a drug falling into any of these categories (including
prescriptions for approved indications) would require an accompanying
diagnostic code. 0 2
Gray box warnings are treated as the least stringent. 20 3 Gray box warnings
"should presumptively preclude CMS reimbursement, unless CMS makes a
deliberate decision to the contrary. 20 4 This, as Abbott and
Ayres note, would
20 5
likely affect private insurers' coverage determinations.
One problem with the proposed gray box warnings is that the FDA
currently lacks the authority to determine coverage decisions, which are
made by CMS. 20 6 Other than a small FDA-CMS pilot program in which the
two agencies jointly participated in drug approval and coverage
determinations, these decisions are made independently. 20

7

It is likely that

one of two changes requiring congressional action would be necessary for
this proposal to be effective. Either Congress could empower the FDA to
make certain coverage determinations, or Congress could require CMS to
abide by the FDA's gray box determinations. 0 8
Abbott and Ayres's next level of stringency comes in the form of black
19

1Id. at 410.

199Id.at 412.
200Id.
201

Id. at 413.

202Id.
203

Id. at 413-15.

204

Id.at 415.

205Id.

James D. Chambers et al., Medicare Covers the Majority ofFDA-Approved Devices and
PartBDrugs, butRestrictionsand DiscrepanciesRemain, 32 HEALTHAFF. 1109, 1109
206

(2013).
0

2 7 Id., Payor Communication Task Force, U.S.

FOOD & DRUG AMIN.,
https://www. fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-innovation/payor-communication-task-force (last
updated July 31, 2019).
208 See

Chambers et al., supra note 206, at 1109 (discussing the different standards the FDA
and CMS have regarding decisions to approve and cover new medical technologies and how
those differences "have made it difficult to achieve consistency in decision making").
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box warnings. 20 9 In addition to the ban on off-label promotion, the
requirement for diagnostic codes, and the presumptive bar on CMS coverage,
off-label prescriptions for drugs in this category could be subjected to various
requirements such as a mandate that the prescriber obtain informed
consent.2 10

Finally, the most stringent are red box warnings, which would prohibit the
"most dangerous and most problematic" off-label uses as well as
promotion. 21 1 To accomplish this, red box warnings would state that "the
FDA considers violating a red-box warning conclusive evidence of
malpractice and grounds for discipline. '212 Abbott and Ayres also suggested
the possibility that "a statutory amendment might provide for direct civil
liability to the agency. 2 13
The red box warnings proposal raises concerns that the FDA would be
venturing too far into the regulation of the practice of medicine.214 Even if
one finds this to be normatively desirable, such a statutory change would
certainly face fierce resistance from organized medicine and others. 215 It is
likely that even a rulemaking by the FDA to add "malpractice and grounds
216
for discipline" language would be difficult to complete.
Abbott and Ayres provide examples of how their proposed scheme would
work.217 One concerned the antipsychotic drug Seroquel, which was FDAapproved for schizophrenia and mania-associated bipolar disorder. 218
Approximately three-quarters of prescriptions for Seroquel are for one of at
least eleven off-label indications. 2 9 In 2009, the FDA required a black box
warning stating that Seroquel was not approved for the treatment of patients
with dementia-related psychosis and that use in these patients was associated
Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 414.
Id. at 413, 415.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 414.
213 Id.
214 Id.; Michael Ollove, PressureMounts to Lift FDA Restrictions On Off-Label Drugs,
7
WASH. POST: HEALTH SCI. (Oct. 8, 201 ), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/pressure-mounts-to-lift-fda-restrictions-on-off-label-dmgs/2017/10/06/568204a0a2f6-1 le7-8cfe-d5b9l2fabc99_story.html.
215 Ollove, supra note 214; Richard Epstein, Government Overreach Threatens Lives,
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY: BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://lawandlibertyblog.com/nyujll/2013/10/2/government-overreach-threatens-lives.
216 Thomas Sullivan, FDA: OffLabelAlay Be the Wrong Label, POL'Y & MED. (May 4,
2018), https://www.policymed.com/2010/05/fda-off-label-may-be-the-wrong-label.html
(citing Gregory Conko & Henry J. Miller, Off Target On Off-Label Drugs, FORBES (May 12,
2010, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/05/12/health-care-drugs-medical-opinionscontributors-henry-miller-gregory-conko.html# 1a9745f3 5b0e).
217 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 417-433.
218 Id. at 4191.
219 Id. at 420. (citing Margaret Maglione et al., Off-Label Use ofAtypicalAntipsychotics: An
Update, 43 COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS REVIEWS 20 (2011),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/ n/cer43/pdf/. See id. at 29-33 (listing treatment for a
variety of conditions, some involving off-label uses of antipsychotics).
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with an increased risk of death.220
The Seroquel example highlights some of the advantages of the Abbott
and Ayres proposal.22 ' In spite of FDA advisories and existing black box
warnings, physicians continued to prescribe Seroquel and other related
antipsychotic drugs in substantial numbers to patients with dementia-related
psychosis. 222 Abbott and Ayres's tiered boxed warning system would impose
more stringent controls over the drug's off-label use. 2 23 Under the proposal,
Seroquel's black box warning would have triggered the requirement that all
prescriptions be accompanied by a diagnosis code, which would have
resulted in a more robust knowledge base about off-label prescribing
patterns.224
This example also highlights some of the limitations of the Abbott and
Ayres proposal. One problem is that by the time many of the mechanisms
they propose would have been activated, sufficient data would already have
existed regarding the risks posed by the use of Seroquel for dementiaassociated psychosis. 225 In fact, in 2010 a metanalysis showed no
effectiveness and an increased risk of death in this population.2 26 At this point
the relevance of a clinical trial, which the authors recognize would likely be
unethical, would have been minimal.2 27
A final problem is the volume of work the proposal could add to an already
overtaxed administration. Abbott and Ayres's proposal calls for the FDA to
conduct an individualized assessment of each off-label use in order to
determine whether to require post-market studies. 22 Abbott and Ayres listed
at least eleven off-label uses for Seroquel.22 9 Considering the historical
staffing and funding deficits under which the Agency has labored, adding
multiple in-depth data analyses and potentially many post-market studies to
follow up seems unlikely to be workable.2 3 °
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REDUCING THE RISKS OF OFF-LABEL DRUG USE
Based on foregoing discussion, I can now begin to lay out the features of
220

Id. at 419.

221

Id. at 423.

Id. at 421 (citing Sudeep S. Gill et al., Antipsychotic Drug Use andmortality in Older
Adults with Dementia, 146 ANN. INTERN. MED. 775, 775 (2007)).
223 Id. at 425.
224 Id. at 413.
225 Id. at 414.
222

226

227
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Id. at 425.
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Id. at 420.
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a proposal for addressing the risks of off-label drug use. I consider the
following features necessary:
* A shift of focus away from off-label promotion toward off-label
prescribing;
* Use of a mechanism to distinguish between relatively safe and
unsafe off-label drug uses;
* Sensitivity to the burdens that would be imposed on the FDA and
drug manufacturers;
* Feasibility of implementation without extensive additional
research; and
* Simplicity.
There are also several desirable factors. These include:
* The involvement of parties with superior access to information
about the frequency of off-label prescribing, notably drug
manufacturers;
* The involvement of parties who control off-label prescribing,
notably physicians; and
* Providing greater access to the extensive data and expertise
possessed by the FDA.
A. Proposal
This Article proposes a "soft power" approach that the FDA might take to
address the dangers created by off-label drug activities. Rather than
attempting to ban manufacturers' off-label promotion and providers' offlabel prescribing, the FDA should focus on providing information about the
available clinical data concerning the risks and benefits of qualifying offlabel uses. Specifically, this Article proposes that once off-label prescriptions
account for a certain volume or percentage of a drug's total prescriptions, a
duty to disclose should be imposed on the drug's manufacturer.23'
Under this proposal, the manufacturer would have a duty to disclose to the
FDA all clinical trials, experiences, expert consensus statements, and other
information that bears on the risks and benefits of the drug's off-label use.
The manufacturer would have to disclose all information which the
manufacturer knows or should know based on reasonable diligence. This
disclosure obligation might be implemented in a manner analogous to that

231 One potentially difficult situation might arise where more than one version of the same

drug, such as a brand and at least one generic, is on the U.S. market. It is possible that only
one form might exceed the thresholds which would trigger the duty to disclose.
Alternatively, the thresholds might be reached only by the combined off-label prescriptions
written for some or all versions of the drug. In the former situation the reporting obligations
and the inclusion of the level-of-evidence rating would likely need to apply to all
manufacturers of that drug. This would avoid running afoul of the requirement that generic
drug labels be identical to the label of the reference brand drug. The latter possible situation
suggests that the FDA should consider both aggregated and disaggregated prescription totals.
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suggested by Abbott and Ayres' first set of recommendations.2 32 The
additional burden imposed by the reporting and disclosure requirements
should not be excessive because manufacturers already possess much of this
information.233

The FDA would not make a risk-benefit determination as it does for NDA
applicants. Rather, the Agency would evaluate the strength of the evidence
that supports the off-label use. Such an evaluation might be performed by the
use of an existing algorithm, such as the program used by the
McGill/Harvard/MCPHS researchers.234 This algorithm has been shown to
stratify off-label uses into those with strong support and those without strong
support;235 importantly, this stratification separates off-label uses into highrisk uses and those risks that are approximately the same as the risks of FDAapproved indications.236 In further developing this proposal, a closer
examination of the algorithms that the McGill/Harvard/MCPHS researchers
used will be necessary.
The advantage of using such "off-the-shelf' programs is that this proposal
would be relatively simple to implement. Based on the FDA's evaluation, the
Agency would assign a "level of evidence" rating. Medical professional
societies routinely use such ratings to communicate to providers the strength
of evidence supporting a given use of a drug or procedure.23 7 One possible
implementation would be a simple "Supported by Strong Evidence" or "Not
Supported by Strong Evidence" binary, analogous to the division used in the
McGill/Harvard/MCPHS study. 238 This would include an assessment of
clinical trial data, real-world experience, and official professional society
recommendations. Another possible implementation would contain finergrained distinctions, more like the rating systems used by medical
professional societies, 239 based solely on clinical data.
It is important to distinguish level-of-evidence ratings from "clinical
indication" ratings. The latter inform physicians of an expert panel's
consensus recommendation as to whether a particular treatment is indicated
for a specific indication. 240 The former informs physicians of the strength of
232 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74. See also supra, notes 174, 176 & 181 and

accompanying text.
233 See Abbott & Ayres, supra note 74, at 408.
234 Eguale et al., supra note 90, at 55, 63 (study evaluating and monitoring off-label use of
prescription drugs and its effect on [adverse drug events] in an adult population).
235

Id. at 56-57.

236 Id. at 59.

Opeyemi 0. Daramola, Rating Evidence in Medical Literature, 13 AMA J. ETHICS 46, 46
(2011).
238 Eguale et al., supra note 90 and accompanying text.
239 Daramola, supra note 237, at 59.
237

See Rolla Edward Park et al., PhysicianRatings ofAppropriate Indicationsfor Six
Medical and SurgicalProcedures,76 AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N 766, 766 (1986)
(demonstrating the method of several panels of physicians rating the appropriateness of a
large number of indications for performing medical and surgical procedures).
240
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the evidence that supports the clinical recommendation.2 4' One danger of the
proposal is that physicians and others might interpret a Supported by Strong
Evidence rating to mean that the evidence supports the off-label use. Thus,
adoption of this proposal would make it necessary to educate physicians and
others as to exactly what the FDA-assigned level of evidence was attempting
to communicate.
The key educational component would be to distinguish between FDA
approval of a drug for a given on-label indication and an FDA rating of
Supported by Strong Evidence. FDA approval indicates that the Agency has
found the manufacturer had conducted "adequate tests by all methods
reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under
the conditions prescribed," and had presented "substantial evidence that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the
conditions of use prescribed., 242 In essence, FDA approval means the
Agency has conducted a thorough risk-benefit assessment based on the basic
science, preclinical, and clinical trial data.24 3 By contrast, a rating of
Supported by Strong Evidence would be based on a holistic review that was
simultaneously more inclusive and less stringent than the FDA's formal
approval. Such a rating would not indicate that the FDA had completed a
thorough risk-benefit assessment.
One final aspect that this proposal addresses is where the level of evidence
rating should be displayed on the drug label. As of the 2006 revisions, FDA
drug labels begin with a one-page "Highlights of Prescribing Information.'
This page displays the drug's names, approval date, black box warnings, and
sections containing notifications of recent changes, approved indications and
usage, dosage and administration, dosage forms and strengths,
contraindications, warnings and precautions, adverse reactions, drug
interactions, and uses in specific populations.24 5 This is followed by the "Full
Prescribing Information," divided into as many as seventeen sections.246
Relevant here are the sections containing full information about indications
and usage, contraindications, and warnings and precautions.247
The FDA displays information about off-label drug uses in the "Warnings
and Precautions" section only in the rare instances in which the

241 Daramola,

supra note 237, at 59.

21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2018).
243 Id.
242

See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2015) (requiring manufacturers to label prescription drugs with
specific section headings and content).
245 Id.
244

246

Id.

Other sections of the Full Prescribing Information are dosage and administration, dosage
forms and strengths, adverse reactions, drug reactions, use in specific populations,
overdosage, description, clinical pharmacology, nonclinical toxicology, clinical studies, how
supplied, and patient counseling information.
247
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preponderance of evidence demonstrates a lack of effectiveness.248 However,
the purpose of the proposal put forth here is to inform physicians' prescribing
practices more broadly. As studies have consistently shown, physicians are
often unaware that they are prescribing in an off-label fashion. 249 They likely
believe they are prescribing in a safe and effective manner. 250 Therefore, the
"Warnings and Precautions" section is not a useful place for the level-ofevidence rating. Rather, I propose that the level of evidence rating should
either be included in a new, separate section ("Information of Common,
Unapproved Uses"), or in a new subsection of the "Indications and Usage"
section. The rating should also be included on the "Highlights" page for
maximum visibility. This would require a rulemaking by the FDA to
accomplish.
This proposal harnesses physicians' capacities as learned intermediaries
and their awareness of the threat of liability for negligence or malpractice.
The maxim "first, do no harm" encapsulates many facets of physicians'
inclinations, training, socialization, and practice. Providing physicians with
information, especially information that an off-label use, no matter how
widely accepted, is not supported by strong evidence should serve at a
minimum as a stimulus to look at the clinical data. In fact, the effectiveness
of the proposal might be strengthened by including access to the clinical
information submitted to the FDA, as through a hyperlink on an electronic
version of the drug label.
B. PotentialIssues Raised by the Proposal
This proposal raises a number of questions, including (1) whether the FDA
could implement it without a statutory amendment to the FDCA, (2) whether
including information on the drug label about off-label uses would be
equivalent to allowing manufacturers to promote those uses, and (3) how the
level-of-evidence assignment would interact with state malpractice, tort, and
products liability law? For the moment I assume that the answers to the first
two questions are favorable to the implementation of the proposal. As to the
FDA's statutory authority, the FDCA gives the Agency the power to require
manufacturers to include sufficient information to ensure that a drug may
safely be used. 251 The FDA already mandates the inclusion of information
adverse to the commercial interests of manufacturers (through the existing
black-box warning requirements and, more recently, warnings about certain
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the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
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off-label uses); requiring a level of evidence rating does not seem to be
substantially different.2 52 As to the possibility of manufacturers using the
proposed system to engage in off-label promotion, presenting evidence that
an off-label use is not supported by evidence is counter to the manufacturer's
interest in increasing sales. Where a drug has strong evidence to support an
off-label use, channeling at least some off-label promotion into a format that
is strictly controlled by the FDA (the drug label) may be more desirable than
the impossible to control promotion that takes place at medical conferences
sponsored by the manufacturer. 253 However, both of these questions need
further consideration.
The question of how the level of evidence rating would interact with state
malpractice law is important because of the risk of malpractice liability that
would arise from an official statement about the quality of the clinical data
underlying off-label drug uses might be a powerful motivator of physician
prescribing behavior. 25 4 At present, FDA-approved labels do not include
information about off-label uses. 25 5 This absence of information, however, is
neither dispositive nor even usually important in establishing whether an offlabel use violated the standard of care. 25 6 Rather, off-label uses that are
accepted by the relevant medical community are considered consistent with
the standard of care.2 57 This is established by expert testimony. An FDAapproved label that provides a statement that the quality of data underlying
an off-label use was poor could serve as one piece of evidence in support of
a plaintiffs expert's opinion that the off-label use violated the standard of
care, and might provide the means of impeaching a defense expert's
testimony. 25s Unlike proposals for the FDA to ban certain off-label uses,
these applications of the level of evidence rating seem far removed from the
regulation of medicine by the FDA that would result from a red box
259
warning.
The level-of-evidence rating also raises potential issues regarding the

252 PrescriptionDrugLabeling Resources, U. S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last updated Oct. 23,

2014), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/laws-acts-and-rules/plr-requirements-prescribinginformation (outlining the labeling resources for the Prescribing Information, FDA-approved
patient labeling, and carton and container labeling for human prescription drugs).
253 Michelle Mello, David Studdert, and Troyan Brennan have described how some
communications about off-label drug use are highly visible to the FDA while other
communications are virtually invisible. Presentations at conferences fell into an intermediate
level of visibility, while presentations and oral statements were at the lowest level of
visibility. An FDA-approved label would obviously be highly visible to the Agency. Mello
et al., supra note 17, at 1557.
254 See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 165164, at 1596 (describing physician awareness of
malpractice liability risks).
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liability of manufacturers under state tort and products liability failure to
warn claims. Although the proposed level of evidence rating raises
interesting preemption questions, in states that have adopted the learned
intermediary doctrine this question may be moot. 260 Under the learned
intermediary doctrine, a drug
manufacturer's duty to warn extends only to
the prescribing physician. 261 A "Not Supported by Strong Evidence" levelof-evidence rating on a drug label directed toward physicians might be
construed as an adequate warning against the off-label use. If this is so,
physicians, not drug manufacturers, would face liability for certain off-label
uses of drugs.262 This outcome is consistent with the overall goals of my
proposal. The FDA can still attempt to regulate manufacturers' off-label
promotion. By incorporating a level-of-evidence rating, the FDA could also
create incentives (short of directly attempting to regulate the practice of
medicine) for physicians to eschew unsupported off-label prescribing.
One final objection, which goes to the core of my proposal, is that adding
a level-of-evidence indication on FDA labels, to which prescribers currently
ascribe only limited value, would provide no real incentive to alter
prescribing practices. In short, if prescribers do not read drug labels, why
would an additional warning make a difference? I offer two responses. The
first is that if, as I expect, label statements that a warning is not supported by
strong evidence become useful in negligence and malpractice actions,
prescribers would be motivated to check this part of a drug label. Being a
succinct binary or level, this would involve minimal time and effort. And
once a liability-averse prescriber becomes aware of a not-supported
statement, the next step would be to investigate the quality of the underlying
data on which the statement was based. By simply providing information,
this proposal seeks to avoid even the appearance of directly forbidding a
practice.
The second response recognizes that providers currently do not read
labels. This is exactly why I am proposing that drug labels include
information about off-label uses: there is a profound irony that a document
structured by the entity (the FDA) with the most information about and
expertise in evaluation drug risks is devalued by prescribers. By providing
more information, my hope is that drug labels may be seen as a valuable
resource.
CONCLUSION

Physicians commonly prescribe drugs for indications that have not been
Bexis, The Learned IntermediaryRule in Consumer Protection Claims, DRUG & DEVICE
L. (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2016/10/the-learnedintermediary -rule-in-consumer-protection-claims. html.
61
2 McLeodv. Sandoz, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-01640-RBH, 2017 WL 1196801, at *9 (D.S.C.
Mar. 31, 2017).
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approved by the FDA. Although this practice is necessary and appropriate,
many off-label prescriptions are for indications for which there is no strong
supporting data. Data from a large recent study indicates that the risk of
serious adverse events associated with these prescriptions is much higher
than with prescriptions written for approved indications and for prescriptions
written for off-label indications with strong supporting data. 2 63 Off-label
prescribing thus constitutes a significant public health risk.
The FDA's traditional approach to minimizing this risk has been to restrict
drug manufacturers' off-label promotional activities. But this approach has
achieved only limited success and is facing increasing judicial resistance as
courts expand the commercial speech doctrine. This Article begins the
formulation of an alternative approach, one which focuses more on altering
physicians' off-label prescribing practices.
The approach outlined here is one in which the FDA would inform
physicians of the strength of evidence that supports common off-label drug
uses. When an off-label use exceeds a certain threshold, either in the number
or percent of prescriptions written for that drug, the manufacturer would be
obligated to provide the FDA all available information about the use. The
FDA would then determine the strength of the supporting evidence for that
use and would display that determination prominently on the drug label. This
would provide prescribers with a concise statement of the Agency's expert
analysis of whether common off-label uses are supported by strong evidence.
The goal is that by improving communication between the FDA and
prescribers, the risks associated with off-label drug use may be reduced while
avoiding direct federal regulation of medical practice.

263 Eguale et al., supra note 90.
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